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30 January 1959

STAFF MEETING MINUTES - 27 January 1959

Personnel Present: Mr. Bissell

Col. Burke

Mr. Reber

CHALICE

2. TEST STATUS BOARD - The switch of Aircraft 378 and 342 is underway and 342 will be ready for tests of J75 engine. The following tests are continuing:

- a. Improvement of auto pilot.
- b. Dual oxygen tests.
- c. [redacted]
- d. Noise suppression (using Article 344)
- e. Black Box.
- f. Mods on fuel system. Acceptance tests to be held at EAFB.
- g. Small fix on hydraulic system.

In commenting on above tests Mr. Bissell emphasized that the J75 test had first priority [redacted] Next after the J75 would be the [redacted] and noise suppression. Any of the others should be watched very closely for mounting costs and should be avoided if costs become high.

Mr. Bissell also commented that the noise suppression test should have a lower priority than those products directly concerned with proving aircraft performance. Also that we should not rush into the dual oxygen system since we had operated successfully four years without it and that if do get it we should settle for nothing less than the very best.

[redacted] raised the question as to whether or not new personnel were being trained to provide backstop at EAFB for the various tests. (Later determined from [redacted] that Edwards was ready insofar as personnel was concerned and that in the only department where there was a weakness (ground handling) two new electricians were being trained.

It was decided that an IRAN program should be worked out between Ops and Logs. LAC recommends that we go ahead immediately whereas Logs claims that we are one year ahead insofar as our IRAN schedule is concerned. Mr. Bissell stated that the LAC schedule was not at all acceptable. Col Burke's suggestion was accepted--to wit, that Logs and Ops work out a schedule that is someplace between the Logs and the LAC view.

ACTION: [redacted]

Mr. Bissell emphasized the importance of moving fast on the J75 if it looks good and that it would be worthwhile to tie the J75 tests in with the IRAN program, particularly to determine its adaptability in size to the present fuselage. On the results of the J75 tests would hinge the IRAN policy. In this connection the proposed schedule for the flight tests should be carefully prepared in order to ascertain as quickly as possible the capability of the J75. Col. Burke commented that the beefed-up J57 is expected to raise altitude capability by 1500 feet and that we might want to consider buying both improvements--that is--the J75 and the beefed-up J57. P/W expects to have the latter ready for tests by summer.

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Mr. Bissell pointed out that we owe Kelly Johnson an answer
ASAP on the IRAN schedule, specifically how heavy a load it will
place on IAC.

ACTION: D & P and Col. Geary on procurement J75's and improved
J57 and test programs.

LOGS - IRAN of aircraft.

OPS - Scheduling of aircraft for tests and IRAN oxygen system
tests.

25X1




25X1

4. STATUS OF MISSION - Alert sent, mission plan ready,
Go-No-Go to be sent. (Mission was run and appears targets all well
covered.)

25X1

GUSTO



CORONA

6. STATUS OF CORONA COVER - reported that the
first launch was to have taken place 21 January at 1500 hours and
was to receive TV and radio coverage. The launch was cancelled however
about an hour before blast-off time. Mr. Bissell directed that
Gen. Lehman be informed that we strongly oppose TV coverage, that
to give so much publicity was opposed by all even up to the Chief
Executive level. Should the question arise as to what if any
publicity should be given, Mr. Bissell stated that "reasonable
publicity and announcement in low key" would suffice.

25X1

25X1

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stated that he had briefed the PIO of VAFB, Major Marcus and that the latter felt strongly about playing down the activity and would do everything in his power to sell this idea at Vandenberg. Mr. Bissell then asked [] to check out to determine if it was ARPA that had authorized the TV showing and if not, who it was. [] then added that in checking it might be wise to determine if perhaps a previous commitment with the network had been made and what effect would a cancellation of any such arrangement have from a cover and security point.

ACTION: []

7. OTHER ITEMS - Mr. Bissell reported on his trip to Convair and expressed pleasure at what he found there. It appears that there were some engine problems at [] but he felt these were not insoluble. Insofar as LAC was concerned, Mr. Bissell was disappointed in what Kelly Johnson had to offer. In this connection Mr. Bissell requested Mr. Kiefer to take action on determining whether or not we should take any of the LAC proposals through the wind tunnel stage in view of above. He also commented that he would report his findings to the DCI and [] next week particularly in view of the fact that both were known to be opposed to the staged vehicle and at this point such a vehicle appeared to be the better. He estimated that in ninety days we would have a fix on how good Convair would be.

In discussions with Kelly Johnson, the latter was very optimistic about the use of the J75 engine in the U-2 and talked in terms of increased altitude capability of 4000 feet and the fact that this would add a year to the estimated useful life of the U-2. He foresaw no dimensional problems and no change in wing loading. Therefore, all effort should be made to go after the J75.

ACTION: [] (See paragraph 2 above.)

In connection with the above, Mr. Bissell stated that even though we are endeavoring to hold LAC to the line on money, none the less, in view of the importance of the J75 test, overtime in connection with it was justified.

Mr. Bissell requested a breakdown on the LAC contract to determine how and where LAC was running ahead of original estimates. He requested (a) original breakdown by tasks and (b) new estimate by tasks. Als, a determination as to whether we had been billed for anything we did not agree to accept or for tests that were not part of our program. In this connection, he stated that insofar as tests were concerned, we should determine that a test is definitely indicated before giving money for it.

ACTION: Mr. Kelly. (This action taken, see Memo DDO-0733 dated 28 Jan.)

Mr. Bissell also commented that we should take a very sharp look at LAC's proposals before committing any money for the GUSTO program. In this connection emphasis should be placed on control through programs not at the point of contract.

CABLE TRAFFIC - Mr. Bissell advised that cable traffic in the DPD versus DD/P was so heavy that he could not condone continued volume. Emphasis was placed on the amount of verbose cables between [] and he directed that a cutback be effected immediately. Also, there should be less lengthy cables in communications []. He accepted the fact that the nature of the Project program was such that cable traffic must very often be used where in another complex a dispatch would do but added that his concern was with length of messages more than with number.

ACTION:

[] (Taken.)

APPROVED:

[]
WILLIAM BURKE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director, DPD-DD/P

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